Preface
This study applies some o f the theoretical tools developed by Michel Foucault to the problem o f the African body as it exists to western socio-medical science1 in Africa. Foucault argued that all methods of knowing the human body relate to it not as a means o f discovery against an object waiting to be known, but as a productive power towards an object that is also its effect. The concept defining this productive relationship between method and object is 'disciplinary power' (Foucault 1977) , which consists in the techniques by which human bodies are observed, analysed and fabricated as knowable entities possessed of particular attributes and characteristics. For example, each time it enters the surgery to invite clinical examination by the doctor, or is physically inspected and radiographed in the mine medical ex amination, the African body is not found but fabricated by these socio medical micro-powers, not so much their discovery as an invention o f their power.
The Anatomy of Power is therefore a genealogical study in that it examines the relations between socio-medical practices as power and the resultant knowledges o f the African body: T h e exercise o f power perpetually creates knowledge and, conversely, knowledge constantly induces the effects of power' (Foucault, in C. Gordon 1980: 52) . The consequence o f this is a concern not with what is there but rather with what can be seen, and the study articulates a close historical cor respondence between the use o f certain methods and the perceived nature o f the African body. This makes it possible to analyse changes over time in the identity b f the African body as an effect o f this productive relationship, rather than a consequence o f discovery, the lifting of oppression and ideological distortion, or any other explanatory device drawn from the discourse o f progressive humanism that informs conventional analyses o f the socio-medical sciences in colonial and most other situations.
The assumptions and aims o f the study derive therefore from a plane of cognition independent from that o f humanism. Hence it can pose a variety o f 'strategic questions' (Armstrong 1987) about particular objects and experiences (such as the body, the mind and subjectivity) which because they form the philosophical bedrock o f humanism can not be problematized from within the humanist framework itself. How is it possible to speak o f the human body in general and the African body in particular as distinct corporeal entities? What made possible the perception o f an African personality' and later 'black consciousness' as the psychological component o f identity? How could medicine have first asserted and later denied the fact o f racial differences in physiology and disease susceptibility? What conditions o f possibility had to be present for the ideas o f culture and urbanization to emerge into the socio-medical knowledge o f Africa? Flowing from this space o f strategic questioning are the three aims o f the study.
First, to describe the genealogical method by which this study has been produced, and to articulate how the Foucauldean schema con ceptualizes body, power and knowledge. Second, to apply these concepts to analysing how the African body has been analysed in western thought from the Renaissance2 to the 1990s, and in doing so to identify the power implications o f changes in how it has been known and what it has been seen to be. Third, to examine the implications o f the study's findings and the Foucauldean method for socio-medical practitioners and scholars o f the sociology o f medicine.
While most o f the source materials for this study concern the socio medical sciences in South Africa, this does not limit its relevance to that society. Although its generalizability is restricted in respect o f the precise details concerning when, how and with what effects the socio medical sciences emerged, the more general anatomy o f power and the bodies that this produces are most certainly applicable to all situations o f colonial occupation. Indeed, it is difficult to identify a single example o f a colonial or post-colonial society in which the public-health official, the primary-health-care nurse, the hospital doctor, the psychiatrist and many other representatives o f the socio-medical sciences are not a ubiquitous presence. It is equally impossible to identify any setting where the population has no knowledge o f how to act and react in the ritual o f the medical examination by the doctor, inspection by the aid worker, interrogation by the anthropologist or enumeration by the census officer. Wherever such figures and rituals appear, the diagram o f power cannot be reduced to a simple equation o f power as that which is held and wielded by one group over another, since wherever they appear is also where discipline is at play, fabricating the human body and the social as its visible objects and effects.
However, while this means that colonial power is always more com plex and invisible than conventional analyses would suggest, it is also true that its disciplinary underbelly cannot be regarded as evenly dis x • The anatomy o f power tributed in equal circuits operating everywhere with the same intensity and the same results. Rather, it should be thought o f as a constantly mutating force field in which socio-medical discipline waxes and wanes in unpredictable cycles and surges. In turn, this implies that while the identity o f the African body is always in part an effect of this power, its precise genealogy is situationally specific, demanding that the fine details o f its crystallization be established through equally fine-tuned studies o f the exact mechanisms by which it is examined and by which its culturally and chronologically specific attributes and characteristics are determined.
Chapter i reviews existing historical accounts o f the association between the socio-medical sciences and the African body. This shows that despite its prominence in these traditional accounts (which range from Whig histories celebrating medicine to Marxist histories o f medi cine as repression), there is no history o f the African body itself, which is unproblematically assumed to be a given object there to be impinged upon and resist socio-medical practices. By comparing these traditional accounts with the genealogical method, Chapter i explicates how genea logical explorations differ from conventional modes o f analysis.
Chapter 2 presents a theoretical elaboration o f those Foucauldean concepts concerning power, the body and medical knowledge relevant to this study. The emergence o f disciplinary power and the correlative constitution by medicine o f the human body as a clearly differentiated collection o f organs and tissues occurred with some suddenness and only towards the end o f the eighteenth century. How was the body seen prior to this great shift? By what languages was the body read, and how did beings believed to exist on and beyond the fringes o f the known world confirm these ancient ways o f knowing?
An attempt to answer these questions appears in Chapters 3 and 4. Chapter 3 examines texts concerning the body, its properties, and its possible forms produced in the period o f Renaissance thought from around 1500 to 1650. During this period human bodies were known not through their direct inspection but through the study o f authoritative texts. These texts repeatedly affirmed the resonance o f human bodies with astrological and climatic forces, which alongside the legends and virtues attaching to bodies were as much a characteristic o f their des cription as any morphological features. Roughly coinciding with the European colonization o f Africa, the age o f Renaissance thought gave way from the mid-seventeenth century to the age o f Classification.
For the first time, and as examined in Chapter 4, there now commenced 'a meticulous examination o f things themselves' (Foucault 1973: 131) . Living beings began to be ordered not according to their 'imaginary' characteristics o f old, but in terms o f their perceptible physical structures. It was therefore at this point that the African body first emerged into western knowledge in something approximating to the distinctively human form we now take for granted, as along with the plants and animals of Africa it was made an object o f natural history and installed in the botanical classification system of Linnaeus as ' Afer Niger' under the category 'homo sapiens'.
While the Classical age produced an African body without organs as the object and effect o f its taxonomic vision to the body's surface, it was only towards the mid-i8oos and with the emergence o f 'missionary medicine' that it became possible to speak freely o f this body as an object possessed o f an interior anatomy. This transformation is ex amined in Chapter 5, which analyses the medical missionary method and its fabrication o f the relationship between African witchcraft; and illness as the primary target o f an evangelizing project to 'save' Africans by 'weaning' them from 'heathen' superstitions concerning the body and disease.
Because it is both target and effect o f the socio-medical practices that sustain and transform it, the human body as an object o f disciplin ary power can never be considered finished or approaching completion. On the contrary, its contingent status means that it is constantly created and re-created as different components o f the socio-medical apparatus negotiate and install different relationships between the body and its disciplinary micro-powers. This is reflected in Chapters 6 to 10, which examine the multiple African bodies fabricated in four distinct domains.
Chapter 6 focuses upon the machinery o f mining medicine and its production o f the migrant labour force as a closely monitored economy o f bodies, disease and deviance. Through the simultaneous deployment o f procedures that penetrated deep within the body to fabricate the space o f anatomical pathology, and o f surveillance techniques directed to the gaps between bodies, this industrious medicine at once individual ized the body o f the African miner and encased it in a network o f rules devoted to the training o f healthy conduct and regulation o f bodily functions.
The conditions permitting invention o f the African mind as an object o f psychiatry and psychology are explored in Chapter 7. First within the asylum, and from the 1920s increasingly in the urban spaces of conflict between Europeans and Africans, the psychological sciences had by the 1930s crystallized an ' African personality' as their object and effect. By the 1980s, and reflecting the irony o f a progressive humanism that in its quest for liberation produced precisely the authentic African subject as its effect, rejection o f the ' African personality' as an ideological xii • The anatomy o f power myth produced a 'liberatory psychology', which since then has con tinued to elaborate its repertoire o f subjectifying techniques.
Chapter 8 examines public health to show how its technologies produced the African body not through direct inspection, but through problematization o f the spaces between bodies and the fabrication o f a social body. From the turn o f the twentieth century to the mid-i930s, sanitary science produced the social as a series o f gaps between bodies and the environment that were seen as a conduit for the transmission of germs and dirt and so required constant policing through prohibitive measures. In the 1930s, these repressive strategies were displaced by positive techniques directed to recruiting Africans into monitoring and managing their own body-boundaries, as the new method of social medicine transformed the socio-physical space o f old into a psycho social one. The chapter continues with an analysis of the emergence of community health in the 1960s, and concludes with the 'socio-ecological' model o f the new public health as it lays its lines o f surveillance everywhere and throughout the body politic.
Chapter 9 examines what clinical medicine has seen and heard in relation to the African body. Invented in the mid-i930S, the African patient as the objectified effect o f a specifically 'Bantu' clinical practice was confirmed until the 1960s, when a new strand entered the 'Bantu clinic' to enable recognition o f the African patient's culture, beliefs, emotions and ideas as important components o f the clinical encounter. The chapter ends with the 1990s' 'quest for wholeness' and fabrication o f the clinical encounter as a socially constructed ritual where doctor and patient are equally agentic participants in the negotiation o f illness.
As a postscript, Chapter 10 recursively applies the Foucauldean perspective to analysing the failure o f social scientists in Africa to apply Foucault's ideas to the field o f socio-medical practice. Closely bound up with the notions o f ideology, repression and liberation that dominate conventional critical analyses, this failure is read as an ironic con firmation for the success o f disciplinary power in fabricating the African body as an apparently transcendental entity and the socio-medical practitioners who see it as potentially platonic observers.
Itself part o f the Foucauldean discourse that makes such an exercise possible, this study cannot be viewed as independent o f the domain it analyses. Indeed, precisely because there are no objects o f knowledge in the absence o f methods for their production, the study is itself a productive component in the discursive context o f post-modernism, and it makes no claims to being more correct than existing explorations o f the same domain. What is instead hoped is that its analyses o f the African body will destabilize what otherwise is experienced as certainty, Preface ■ xiii to induce an appreciation o f seemingly trivial practices as invested with a power that in penetrating and rearranging the objects o f medical knowledge actively create and regulate the human body.
Like every other subset of bodies produced by socio-medical power everywhere, the African body is not a fixed phenomenon waiting to be distorted by ideological filters or o f which medical doctors gradually achieve a more accurate understanding. The human body as a static phenomenon does exist, but only as a product o f the modernist discursive regime upon which both Whig histories o f scientific progressivism and Marxist histories of liberal humanism rest. Because these accord an ahistorical essentialism to the body they must themselves be considered instruments o f disciplinary power, in so far as they operate to obscure the body's contingent status as an end-product o f the very force relations they construe as emanating from it. Notes 1. By the socio-medical sciences is meant all those disciplines (e g. clinical medicine, public health, psychology, psychiatry, anthropology, sociology and so on) that have at some point been deployed in Africa to manage the relation of Africans to disease, illness and the social context in which these occur.
2. Since the very idea of the African body as we now know it was not a possibility in the Renaissance, it is, stricdy speaking, incorrect to write as if there was such an entity in this period. However, and as shown in Chapter 3, there certainly was a class of bodies believed to exist in the geographical region now known as Africa, and it is to this class of bodies that use here of the term African body' refers. The African body appears everywhere in studies o f social science and medicine in Africa. For instance:
The Government and the frontier colonists did all they could and at Kingwilliamstown [sic] droves of hungry and dying natives applied daily to Dr. Fitzgerald for help. His fame as a medicine man spread like wildfire and by August, 1856 he could report enthusiastically on the treatment of 2,278 cases. (Burrows 1958: 182) As well as appearing in historical studies, the African body is a central focus o f current socio-medical practice:
In Johannesburg a family of surveys has been conducted by the AIDS Virus Research Unit of the Medical Research Council at the National Institute of Virology. These sentinel surveys show that, in STD clinics, 14.6% and 20.4% of black males and females respectively are infected with HIV. This is in comparison to 4.2% and r.8% of white males and females respectively. (Steinberg 1993: 90) Despite its ubiquitous presence in historical accounts and contemporary research materials the African body itself is only rarely the subject of historical analysis. Instead, it appears to have been assumed that the African body is possessed of a transcendental ontological status that permits its existence beyond history.
What has therefore been studied in some detail is how representations o f the African body in western socio-medical thought have changed over time (e.g. Dietrich 1993; Gilman 1985; Pratt 1992; Seedat 1993) , and how its differing treatment within the formal health-care system has reflected the changing social, economic and ideological climate (e.g. De Beer 1984). Because they assume the pre-existence o f the African body as an unvarying entity in an external reality round which these his torically variable ways o f treating it circle, these conventional accounts are not histories of the body, but instead are histories of ideas, images, policies and professions. The present study does not therefore attempt yet another explanation in terms o f an historical progression from the past to the present o f why sub-branches o f the social sciences and medicine devoted to African health and illness appeared, developed and disappeared. In fact, while many o f the texts it assembles come from times well before this study commenced, it would be wrong even to think o f it as a history in the conventional sense o f the term. Rather, it demonstrates how the African body has been created and transformed as an object o f knowledge, how its attributes and capacities are contin gent upon the methods applied to know it, and therefore how strategies o f the state and industry, along with the various socio-medical sciences that assume its existence, are possible.
How can this question o f the African body as a distinct object of socio-medical knowledge have been so thoroughly ignored? An answer to this is offered by distinguishing the genealogical method and its histories o f the present from the more conventional notion o f the history o f the past.
Histories o f medicine as achievement, function and repression
Existing histories o f the socio-medical sciences in South Africa are all histories o f the past. That is, they project backwards from the present concepts such as economy, ideology and epidemiology in an attempt to trace how patterns o f disease and health-care have altered over time to produce the present situation. These histories can be classified into three broad categories on the basis o f how they explain the emergence o f the socio-medical disciplines in relation to Africans and the socio political order more generally.
On the one hand, there are histories o f medicine as achievement that portray the discipline's unfolding as one o f linear progression driven by factors internal to the medical profession and the scientific method. On the other hand are histories o f medicine as repression, that emphasize the place o f the socio-medical sciences in relation to Africans as instru mental components o f colonialism and capitalism, and tend to interpret the achievements paraded by the first class o f histories less as triumphs than as markers o f tyranny. In between these two extremes, there is an intermediary class o f medical histories that construe the socio-medical sciences as having developed into their present configuration because there was so much disease that required treatment. Following Nettleton (1992: 2), this last class o f histories reflects a 'functional approach'.
Histories o f medicine as achievement
And so down the ages these 'mighty medicine men', ... have helped push the boundaries of medical knowledge further forward. Their achievements brought enlightenment and inspiration to succeeding generations, for the work of the present and future is based always on that of the past. (Krige 1939: 72) In 1939, The Leech devoted one entire edition to an historical review of the technological advances underlying the development o f medicine in Europe, and how these had enabled the expansion o f medical services in Africa. The motivation lay in the idea that a knowledge o f the past would limit the possibility o f erring in the present: 'Medical history ... prevents us from losing our sense o f proportion; its kindly light leads us back to the world o f practical realities, and assists us in gaining a proper perspective on health and disease' (Editorial 1939: 7) .
Some fifteen years later, the idea that medical history could help retain a 'proper perspective' on the practice and problems o f medicine found its first sustained expression1 in relation to South African medical history with the publication o f three books devoted to the topic (Burrows 1958; Hattersley 1955; Menko 1954) . Best defined as Whig histories in that they were written for the medical profession, these texts drew upon biographical accounts o f people whom their authors considered great doctors to produce heroic accounts o f how they had succeeded in establishing western medicine in the barren and hostile context o f a new continent and African antipathy toward bio-medicine. A record o f the development o f medicine in a young country depends upon the origins o f its people and the sources o f its civilization' , wrote Burrows (1958: 3) . Elaborating this theme, he said o f 'the solid achieve ments o f the early pioneers o f medical organization' that:
It was ... they who planted the germ of medical politics and professional union in South Africa; and it was they who were responsible for the emerg ence of a medical public opinion in the Cape Colony. Without continual pressure of voluntary associations of doctors ... the Colonial Government would probably have delayed its health legislation to the present century ... certainly the profession would have been a great deal poorer in their absence. (Burrows 1958: 367) In 1959, a Natal newspaper celebrated the centenary o f the King William's Town Hospital with a review o f its history to 'honour the memory o f those who went before, those who by faith, courage and fortitude gave a living example in the greatest o f all lessons -man's humanity to man' (Mercury 1959: 4). Producing a similar image o f western medicine in Africa as the triumphal product o f remarkable medical pioneers, the dust jacket to Laidler and Gelfand's (1971) volume superimposed sketches o f important doctors upon images of Boer trek wagons to connote the unstoppable march o f medicine and 'civiliza tion'. A similar theme characterized Gelfand's (1984) Christian Doctor and Nurse, which set out the missionary medical struggle involved in bringing 'God's Medicine' to the African.
In the mid-1970s a second wave o f Whig histories that attributed medicine's development less to the agency o f particular individuals and more to the inevitable progress o f science began to appear (e.g. Brink 1988; James 1975; Malan 1988) . Epitomizing this tradition is the dedication to Malan's (1988) The Quest of Health, where he portrays a medicine that 'through observation and research' rose 'out o f the abyss o f tradition, myth, superstition and philosophy into the light of scientific under standing' . By this time the need for comprehensive public health legislation had been made undeniably clear by the gross failure of the existing organisation to deal with the epidemic. Throughout the country the demand for rapid and concrete action in this direction was clamorous. The Friend was one of several newspapers to express this sentiment, pointing out that the calamity of the 'flu affords as terrible an object lesson of the need of a Public Health Act administered in the main by central authority as Nature in her most maleficent mood could have devised '. (H. Phillips 1990: 162) In like fashion, but adding an economic factor into the complex of needs, Murray (1963: 391) argued that the South African Institute for Medical Research grew in response to 'the need for research into dis eases which were o f vital economic importance to the mining industry'.
Functional histories o f medicine
Histories o f medicine as repression Histories that explain medicine's development in Africa as achievement or as a functional response to overwhelming need do not lend any special focus to the African. Cer tainly, Africans are present in these stories, but their role is a peripheral one, subordinate to the heroic deeds o f white doctors (the achievement approach) or swept up with Europeans in the all-engulfing tide of disease (the functional approach). In sharp contrast, it is primarily upon the African that histories o f medicine as repression (which began to appear in the mid-1970s) are focused. For instance, Swanson's (1977) paper on bubonic plague and urban native policy in the Cape Colony between 1900 and 1909, argued how:
[M]edical officials and other public health authorities at the turn of this century were imbued with the imagery of infectious disease as a societal metaphor, and that this metaphor powerfully interacted with British and South African racial attitudes to influence the policies and shape the institu tions of segregation ... Overcrowding, slums, public health and safety, often seen in the light of class and ethnic differences in industrial societies, were in the colonial context perceived largely in terms of colour differences. Conversely, urban race relations came to be widely conceived and dealt with in the imagery of infection and epidemic disease ... In this context the accident of epidemic plague became a dramatic and compelling opportunity for those who were promoting segregationist solutions to medical problems. (Swanson 1977: 387) Placing equivalent emphasis upon state manipulation of health-care resources in the service o f African oppression, the World Health Organization's 1983 volume Apartheid and Health stated that 'apartheid has shown itself to be a veritable racist ideology ... And it is this racist ideology which guides all health action in South Africa' (WHO 1983: 6) . Extending this theme, a chapter on the origins o f South African society and its health system showed how 'The patterns o f disease and health care relate directly to the nature o f its industrialization and the unequal distribution o f resources rather than to any lack o f "development" among the black population. Health care policies are directly related to more general government strategies o f control through reform' (WHO At the core o f these histories o f medicine as repression is the idea that the actions o f medical practitioners and policy-makers were in evitably imbued with the exploitative interests and ideology o f colonial imperialism. Arnold's 1988 volume Imperial Medicine and Indigenous Societies was therefore concerned 'not so much with disease and medi cine as such as with their instrumentality -what they reveal about the nature and process, the ambitions and methods of an encompassing imperialism ' (Arnold 1988: ii) . The emphasis in these histories of medicine as repression is therefore upon the equation o f socio-medical power with a physical and symbolic force concentrated in the hands of the ruling elite who use it to negate and constrain the authenticity and freedom of those it is turned upon. H isto rio g rap h y , p ro g re ss and the p resen t This brief historiography o f the socio-medical sciences in Africa demon strates how explanations for the discipline's emergence are relative to the author's historical context, professional affiliation and political per suasion. This is a far from remarkable observation, the very method of historiography having arisen precisely in response to the observation that histories o f the past inevitably reveal as much about the author's historical and political context as they do about the subject matter. But there is a more fundamental point to be taken from this review that renders what are ostensibly politically polarized versions o f the past components o f a single discursive formation.
This commonality is twofold. First, all three types o f history sub scribe to an idea o f history as one o f continuity and progression. For histories o f achievement, these developments are internal to the socio medical professions, involving increasing altruism on the part o f doctors and inevitable scientific progression as new medical techniques make possible the abandonment o f erroneous beliefs. For functional histories, this human agency and intra-scientific development is subordinate to the external pressure o f disease. This forces development o f the medical enterprise to mean that its shape today is the product o f past disasters and current needs. For histories o f medicine as repression, the shape of the enterprise at any given point reflects the outcome o f repression and resistance, through which the concentration o f medical power in the hands o f the state and medical professionals is continually usurped and replaced by a more egalitarian system. In their preoccupation with progress, all three types o f history thus reproduce what Foucault des cribed as among 'the most harmful habits in contemporary thought ... the analysis o f the present as ... a presence o f rupture, or o f high point, or o f completion or o f a returning dawn' (Foucault, in Kritzman 1988: 35) .
The second facet o f this commonality derives from the first. Because all three historical types privilege accounts o f how individuals and groups seized socio-medical power or were systematically debarred from accessing it, they fail to problematize the African body itself by assum ing it to exist independently o f the socio-medical practices they address. For only if it is taken to have an existence independent o f these practices can there be any progress towards more adequately understanding and treating the African body; or from the repressionist perspective, away from its oppression toward its liberation. In terms of the Foucauldean power schema, they all speak in one way or another to the idea of 'sovereign power' (Foucault 1977) alone, the idea that power exists as a commodity or weapon there to be grasped and wielded, fought for and won over. They consequently fail to grasp the significance o f such apparently innocent rituals o f disciplinary power as the routine clinical examination or school medical inspection: 'Look at the lines o f medical surveillance: "What is your complaint?" "How do you feel?" "Please tell me your troubles." See the routine clinical techniques: the rash dis played, the hand applied to the abdomen, the stethoscope placed gently on the chest' (Armstrong 1987: 70).
As Chapter 2 argues, these procedures are the stuff o f disciplinary power, repetitive, ritualized and, no matter how repressive the more encompassing socio-political context, strategies to which the entire population at times must yield.
Using the theoretical tension between sovereign and disciplinary power, this study provides a different perspective. It problematizes the African body itself, rather than the legal enactments, professional powerplays and political struggles that constantly envelop and take its existence for granted. It has no interest in whether the South African Health Act No. 63 o f 1977 did or did not represent a move from discrimination towards a progressive politics (WHO 1983: 99) . It is unconcerned with whether it really was 'with the arrival o f white settlers that our people fell prey to a host o f diseases' (WHO 1983: 14) ; and it has no interest in re-creating the machinations through which the apartheid state suppressed public knowledge concerning the true extent o f cholera epidemics in the early 1980s (Marks and Andersson 1988: 257-8) . In short, this study does not attempt to reconstruct the past through the conceptual and political lens o f the present, but rather to produce a 'history of the present' that examines socio-medical ob jects, concepts and practices within their own temporal specificity.
The genealogical method and histories o f the present In a discussion of the genealogical method, Armstrong (1990) distinguished it from quanti tative and qualitative methods. Quantitative methodologies trace the extent in society o f a given object o f interest such as income, age or disease. Qualitative methods provide a means of demonstrating the subjective impact and meaning that a particular income, a certain age or particular disease have upon and for people and groups. However, by elevating to primacy their objects o f study and ignoring their own presence in the analytic field, both approaches eliminate themselves from this field. As a result their objects o f enquiry appear as given, their existence and form independent o f the methods used to define, describe and explain them. The corollary o f this is that changes in how objects o f enquiry appear are attributed to forces inherent in the object (society has evolved, a person has developed, the disease has mutated), or to scientific progress that by improving investigative methods (enhanced methods o f recording and counting events, microscopes with a higher resolution) reveals what was always there, but before such improvements were hidden by darkness (Armstrong 1990) . Either way, observers are saddled with the explanatory problem that whatever they may posit cannot be separated from the contemporary universe o f explanation and methodology in which the idea is produced, since a recent explanatory category cannot be used to explain itself.
In response to this problem o f explanatory anachronicity Foucault drew upon Nietzsche to formulate the concept o f genealogical analysis. The ideas o f descent and emergence are central to the notion of genealogy. Descent makes no pretensions to going back in time to restore 'an unbroken continuity' (Foucault, in Bouchard 1977: 146) or establish any particular present as 'the unique or fundamental or irruptive point in history where everything is begun or completed again' (Foucault, in Kritzman 1988: 35) . Instead, descent 'disturbs what was previously considered immobile; it fragments what was thought unified; it shows the heterogeneity of what was imagined consistent within itself' (Foucault, in Bouchard 1977: 147) -Methodologically, descent means that genealogy avoids the assumption that any concepts (such as life, the body, consciousness or sexuality) are static, in favour o f docu menting the profusion o f events in which such concepts form and fade and outlining the discursive regimes that make them formalized objects o f knowledge and targets for intervention. Hence history, life, the human body, disease, society or the psyche are all legitimate foci o f descent, lacking any trans-historical stability and all the effects rather than the origins of the play o f disciplinary forces. Applied to the human body, this means that 'It is not that the beautiful totality o f the individual is amputated, repressed, altered by our social order, it is rather that the individual is carefully fabricated in it, according to a whole technique o f forces and bodies ' (Foucault 1977: 217) .
Because they do not presuppose their objects' existence, the power mechanisms that co-vary with how the body is known cannot be identi fied with the works o f great doctors or the impact o f legal enactments and ideological forces, since all impinge upon and so take for granted the existence o f the human body and human interests. Instead, the mechanisms o f power discerned by descent are at the extremity of power, 'those points where it becomes capillary' (Foucault, in C. Gordon 1980: 96) -such as 'the single unencumbered gaze o f one doctor to an inflamed joint or diseased lung o f an individual patient' (Armstrong 1990 (Armstrong : 1226 . For it is here, as the patient bares the chest to the listening ear o f the doctor's stethoscope, that power has its immediate effects in creating the corporeal objects o f human experience.
Following from the concept o f descent are the data considered germane to genealogical analysis. In this study, descent meant that rather than the biographies and memoirs o f great medical personages or government gazettes detailing public-health Acts, the search was for texts describing the actual procedures applied to African bodies, records o f the minutiae by which they were handled by doctors and moulded by architecture, and accounts o f what was seen when Africans were opened up to anatomical investigation. As well as privileging accounts o f the minutiae o f socio-medical practice, the genealogical method also differs from conventional historical methods in drawing no distinction between primary and secondary sources. Instead, all sources (diaries, textbooks, transcriptions o f spoken interviews etc.) are considered primary for their own period o f authorship. This is because all texts are chronologically specific in that they can only draw upon the conceptual repertoire available to their authors at the time o f production. For example, since it enters African socio-medical discourse only in the late 1800s, it is impossible to speak o f a distinctive African anatomy and physiology before then.
If descent disturbs a sense o f continuity from the past to the present by fragmenting what was considered immutable, then emergence, or the entry into discursive existence of particular objects of knowledge, upsets assumptions that seek the origins o f things in neatly ordered ensembles o f indexical events: 'Historians have been accustomed to a history which takes in only the summits, the great events' (Foucault, in C. Gordon 1980: 37) . Against 'great events', emergence casts the effective forces o f history as continuous responses to haphazard conflicts, an unending play o f dominations, subjugations and struggles, for which the formal centres o f power in any society are simply concentrations o f disciplinary power within this generalized force field. The human body is thereby constantly appearing and vanishing, changing and con tinuously being renegotiated as the crystallization o f disciplinary power in the shape o f medical procedures 'discovers' new objects and domains o f illness (Armstrong 1985: 112) .
Genealogy inverts the approach o f conventional history, enabling us to examine power from the assumption that it works not only through repression and inhibition, but also as a creative2 force that fabricates not only the human objects o f social reality, but the social itself: 'Power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains o f objects and rituals o f truth. The individual and the knowledge that may be gained o f him belong to this production' (Foucault 1977: 192) . Hence, as Nettleton (1992: 124) comments, where conventional histories o f the past find continuity, absolutes, stability and noble origins, the genealogical analysis finds discontinuity, no absolutes, instability and mundane events.
H is to ry w ill teach u s n o th in g As this chapter was being written in late 1994, South Africa was celebrating its first 100 days o f democratic government. Among the human sciences history had been propelled to prominence as academics, politicians and ordinary people strived to transcend the politics o f oppression embedded in four centuries o f colonial and apartheid rule. Underlying history's perceived importance was the belief that through a critical review o f the past it was possible to learn from it and avoid repeating earlier patterns interpreted from the vantage point o f the present as corrupt and evil. For instance, a 1993 history o f South African public health initiatives had this to say: ' As South Africa undergoes rapid social, economic, and political change, the rich heritage o f public io • The anatomy o f power health and primary health care that has long been overlooked is being rediscovered ... The article ... critically assesses what South African public health professionals could learn from the past while planning for the future ' (Yach and Tollman 1993: 1043) .
Concerning the psycho-social sciences, critical observers such as Hayes (1993) were equally confident in their claims that careful scrutiny of the past would enhance the probability o f a better present.
The history of psychology's complicity with apartheid and oppression can not simply be wished away. This does not mean either that we have to stay stuck in the shame or guilt of the past. The complex task of transforming psychological theory and practice in terms of a more social liberatory discipline, requires a thorough analysis of the past, so that the lessons of that antipathetic time ... can be properly leamt, and not repeated ... A selfconscious remembering of our history will facilitate an understanding of what constraints and what spaces are available to us. (Hayes 1993: 12) From the Foucauldean perspective, appeals to history as a teacher in how to tame power in the present are futile in that they are always also components o f disciplinary power. Their fault is that they address sovereign power only, repeating the error o f Parisian students in 1968 who believed that following De Gaulle's flight from France the state would vanish. To their bewilderment, the state continued without its head. 'Their mistake was to believe that power could be seized from the person who apparently held it; but power simply ran through their fingers' (Armstrong 1985: 113) . The body itself is at once object, effect and a conduit o f power, the fist raised in defiance o f the soldier a sign o f the beginnings o f a self-existence for the nascent individual. Hence Foucault's famous claim that 'we need to cut off the king's head: in political theory this still has to be done' (Foucault, in C. Gordon 1980: 121) . Sovereign power exists, it inscribes pain, torture and deprivation on the surface o f the skin and in the workings o f the body. But this body, its abuses scrupulously documented by the custodians o f human rights and civil liberty (e.g. Silove 1990; Swartz and Levett 1989; Z w i 1987), is always also a fabrication o f their practices. For from far below the tumult o f sovereign force there arises disciplinary power which is every where, not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere. Sovereign power cannot easily be grasped by everyone but, as shown in Chapter 2, disciplinary power is within the grip o f us all. Notes 1. The first published examinations of medical history in South Africa would appear to be those of Laidler (1937, 1938, 1939) , in which he examined such things as the 'Proclamations' governing the practice of physician or sur geon, and the first use of anaesthetics in the Cape of the early nineteenth century.
2. Use of the terms 'creative' and 'productive' in relation to disciplinary power is intended to show only that this is a power which fabricates objects. It does not imply (as the almost unambiguously positive connotation lent to such terms in their common usage would suggest) that its functioning is 'good' or, for that matter, 'evil'. It is squarely within the second category of work that the present study belongs, and the theoretical materials reviewed here are restricted to those aspects o f Foucault's work pertinent to the study's concern with western socio-medical practice and the African body. Given the diverse qualities o f Foucault's work, it must moreover be emphasized that the methodological apparatus derived from it cannot be thought o f as illustrating the Foucauldean method. As both Nettleton (1992) and Vaughan (1991) have cautioned, and as attested to by the divergency in their own readings o f Foucault, a range o f methodologies could and have been derived from the Foucault schema.
The individual as invention
As shown in Chapter i, conventional histories o f the socio-medical sciences in Africa presuppose a human subject along the lines suggested by the model o f classical philosophy, endowed with a consciousness which power is then thought to seize upon. Standing at the centre o f these studies (whether as dominator or dominated, observer or ob served) is the knowing, seeing, feeling and acting person, for this is always the point from which these analyses are constrained to begin.
The human body and the person are also prominent in the Foucault schema. Not, however, as points o f departure for the human and socio medical sciences, but instead as the very opposite, as the result o f these sciences and therefore the very locus o f insertion o f their knowledge. 'The individual is not a pre-given entity which is seized on by the exercise o f power. The individual, with his identity and characteristics, is the product o f a relation o f power exercised over bodies, multiplicities, desires, forces' (Foucault, in C. Gordon 1980: 74) . In short, Foucault inverts the human body by viewing it not as the origin o f force or source o f answers, but as the effect o f forces and a problem demanding explanation. How is it possible to conceive o f the body? How was it possible that until the end o f the eighteenth century the body did not exist in the sense we know today? The human body and subjectivity as problems requiring explanation rather than objects awaiting scientific or philosophical elaboration are therefore at the core o f Foucauldean theory and its genealogical method, described by Foucault as:
A form of history which can account for the constitution of knowledges, discourses, domains of objects etc., without having to make reference to a subject which is either transcendental in relation to the field of events or runs in its empty sameness throughout the course of history (Foucault, in Gordon 1980: 117) . This refusal to accept the presence of a transcendental, unchanging subject as an explanatory device has led certain theorists to define Foucault as the 'author o f a philosophy o f history based on discontinu ity' (Kritzman 1988: 99)-However, far from a Foucauldean explanatory fiction, the contingent and historically variable subject is in fact a discovery o f the genealogical method, and the attendant notion o f discontinuity a problem requiring resolution and not an answer.
The discovery o f discontinuity and the episteme The preface to Foucault's great genealogical study The Order of Things began with a passage from Borges that quoted a " 'certain Chinese encyclopaedia'" (Foucault 1973: xv) . An unexpected coupling of ordinary and extraordinary things, the passage produced in Foucault a laughter that shattered all the familiar landmarks of my thought -our thought, the thought that bears the stamp of our age and our geography -breaking up all the ordered surfaces and all the planes with which we are accustomed to tame the wild profusion of existing things, and continuing long afterwards to disturb and threaten with collapse our age-old distinction between the Same and Other. This passage quotes a 'certain Chinese encyclopaedia' in which it is written that 'animals are divided into (a) belonging to the Emperor, (b) embalmed, (c) tame, (d) sucking pigs, (e) sirens, (f) fabulous, (g) stray dogs, (h) included in the present classification, (i) frenzied, (j) innumerable, (k) drawn with a very fine camelhair brush, (1) et cetera, (m) having just broken the water pitcher, (n) that from a long way off look like flies'. In the wonderment of this taxonomy, the thing we apprehend in one great leap, the thing that, by means of the fable, is demonstrated as the exotic charm of another system of thought, is the limitation of our own, the stark impossibility of thinking that. (Foucault 1973: xv) Foucault's concern in presenting this passage was to induce in readers a sense that the forms o f knowledge peculiar to our contemporary way o f knowing are limited by what he called the 'conditions o f possibility', or 'episteme' from which they emerge and which they reproduce. For on trying to think out o f this epistemic space we are tugged back in by a subterranean current, an unthinkable force that prevents us from considering the 'Chinese encyclopaedia' as anything other than a quaint taxonomic game.
Foucault attempted various definitions o f episteme, and consistent with the metaphor o f a subterranean force they all referred to an organizing stratum buried well below the level o f epistemology, paradigm or philosophy. For instance, an episteme is the 'total set of relations that unite, at a given period, the discursive practices that give rise to epistemological figures, sciences and possibly formalised systems' (Foucault 1972: 191) . Or, an episteme consists in:
[T]he fundamental codes of a culture -those governing its language, its schemas of perception, its exchanges, its techniques, its values, the hierarchy of its practices -[which] establish for every man, from the very first, the empirical orders with which he will be dealing and within which he will be at home. (Foucault 1973: xx) Given these definitions' obscurity it is perhaps more useful to clarify what Foucault meant by the term by briefly outlining the contours o f the three epistemes he identified: one dominated Renaissance thought, one covered the Classical period, and the last and most recent is that which has governed Modernist thought in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
Each episteme was synonymous with a great swathe in history, and the gaps between them contiguous with the 'massive disjunctions in knowing that their change implied' (Armstrong 1987: 13). These Foucault delineated by comparing how Language, Life and Labour were cognit ively ordered within each episteme. Take the question o f 'life' for instance. In the Renaissance, it was not, strictly speaking, even possible to think o f living things as possessed o f 'life', since it was only with the Modernist episteme that biological science became possible and 'life' could be seen as immanent in a living thing's biological constitution. By contrast, living things in the Renaissance were animated by the great cosmic web o f which they were mere nodes, and from which they gathered the legends and virtues that were an intrinsic part o f their description. With advent o f the Classical episteme at around the mid-seventeenth century, the natural world was transformed by a new way o f seeing that ordered living things according to their perceptible physical structures. Within the Classificatory age, the 'imaginary' char acteristics o f plants, animals and people (which previously were paraded for edification and entertainment in the circular procession o f the show) were jettisoned, and in place o f the show living things were grouped according to their perceptible physical resemblances and arranged for scrutiny by natural scientists in the abstract space of charts and tables, such as exemplified by the botanical taxonomy o f Linnaeus, or the complex disease classification o f Sydenham. A second disjunction occurred towards the end o f the eighteenth century, when the taxonomic gaze o f Classification to the surface o f living things was replaced by a deep gaze that analysed internal structure and its relation ship to function. Functions (such as emotion, instinct and metabolism) are, o f course, invisible, yet their identification to thought marked the emergence into science o f the phenomenon of life, which in its turn became the principal object of the new biology.
Just as the natural history o f the Classificatory age gave way to the Modernist science o f biology, so the analysis o f wealth was replaced by economics, and the study o f general grammar by linguistics.
These three new knowledges were a part of a complete reorganization of knowledge in the late eighteenth century; but, more significandy, these three new sciences of Life, Labour, and Language defined a new central object for the modem episteme, namely what Foucault calls 'Man'; and with the advent of Man arose the specific studies of man in the form of the human sciences. (Armstrong 1987: 62-3) Epistemic archaeology therefore reveals that, when not projected back into time by conventional histories o f the past, a point is reached on the genealogical descent down a continuous present where not only the human subject as the throne o f consciousness vanishes but also the very idea o f life as an immanent o f the body's organization. As a consequence, this same epistemic space and the disjunction between epistemes cannot be explained through recourse to the human subject as a given and the human body as a constant. Hence Foucault's concern to make clear that discontinuity was not an explanation but a problem.
In Les Mots et les choses I set out ... from this self-evident discontinuity and tried to ask myself the question: is this discontinuity really a discontinuity? Or, to be precise, what was the transformation needed to pass from one type of knowledge to another type of knowledge? For me, this is not at all a way of declaring the discontinuity of History; on the contrary, it is a way of posing discontinuity as a problem and above all a problem to be resolved. (Foucault, in Kritzman 1988: 100) In revealing how the human sciences became possible only in the late eighteenth century, The Order of Things (1973) had already begun to suggest the historical contingency o f biology and human anatomy. It was, however, in The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology o f Medical Per ception (1976) that the genealogical method found specific application to the problem o f human anatomy, for it was here that Foucault first traced how the concrete individual o f conventional history was invented as an object of positive knowledge and opened up to the language of rationality (Foucault 1976: xiv) .
The gaze and the problem o f human anatomy 'The gaze' is a term that appears frequently in this and other Foucauldean studies o f power and medical knowledge. It refers both to how things have appeared to medicine and to the techniques by which medicine has made things appear, in coming to have a particular knowledge o f the human body. As such, the gaze is not merely some cognitive or perceptual skill waiting to be grasped by the doctor and cultivated through medical training. On the contrary, while it certainly is through training in the socio-medical sciences that the gaze is reproduced, it is the gaze as technique that makes possible the very idea o f a bodily interior and the doctor as its observer, and it is the gaze as limit that circumscribes how the doctor is taught, how the doctor practises and hence what the doctor can see.
The great biological image of a progressive maturation of science still underpins a good many historical analyses; it does not seem to me to be pertinent to history. In ... medicine ... up to the end of the eighteenth century one has a certain type of discourse whose gradual transformation, within a period of twenty-five or thirty years, broke not only with the true' propositions which it had hitherto been possible to formulate but also, more profoundly, with the ways of speaking and seeing, the whole ensemble of practices which served as supports for medical knowledge. These are not simply new discoveries, there is a whole new 'regime' in discourse and forms of knowledge. (Foucault, in C. Gordon 1980: 112) To illustrate this crucial point concerning the temporal specificity o f the gaze and how it produces the doctor and in turn the human body as its objects and effects, Foucault began the Birth of the Clinic by juxtaposing two contrasting images o f what was seen by two physicians, one writing in the 1700s the other in the 1800s. First, Pomme's eighteenth-century description o f the treatment o f a female hysteric, which relied upon ideas o f nervous pathology and derived its description o f the body from the study o f texts. Assuming the cause of hysteria to be dryness and 'desiccation' o f an 'overheated' nervous system, treat ment involved 'making her take "baths, ten or twelve hours a day, for ten whole months'" (Foucault 1976: ix) , with the result that:
'membranous tissues like pieces of damp parchment ... peel away with some slight discomfort, and these were passed daily with the urine; the right ureter also peeled away and came out whole in the same way'. The same thing occurred with the intestines, which at another stage, 'peeled off their internal tunics, which we saw emerge from the rectum. The oesoph agus, the arterial trachea, and the tongue also peeled in due course; and the patient had rejected different pieces either by vomiting or expectoration'. (Pomrne, in Foucault 1976: ix) Second, and written less than a hundred years after Pomme's des cription, was Bayle's nineteenth-century account o f the anatomical detail o f the brain, produced through direct inspection o f the body, and relying upon the idea o f anatomical pathology; 'Their outer surface, which is next to the arachnoidian layer of the dura mater, adheres to this layer, sometimes very lightly, when they can be separated easily, sometimes very firmly and tighdy, in which case it can be very difficult to detach them. Their internal surface is only contiguous with the arachnoid, and is in no way joined to it ... The false membranes are often transparent, especially when they are very thin; but usually they are white, grey, or red in colour, and occasionally, yellow, brown, or black. This matter often displays different shades in different parts of the same mem brane. The thickness of these accidental productions varies greatly; some times they are so tenuous that they might be compared to a spider's web'. (Bayle, in Foucault 1976: ix-x) This juxtaposition reveals the gaze itself, since had they witnessed the same event neither physician could have seen what the other saw.
Arising from our contemporary embedment in a world seen accord ing to Gray's Anatomy, the inclination is to dismiss Pomme's description as fanciful or mistaken, for unlike Bayle's account o f the brain it fails to confirm the contemporary belief in the truth o f disease as residing within the body itself. But the real error is to assume that the earlier vision could be mistaken. For, and as confirmed by their convergence with the epistemic shifts identified in The Order of Things (Foucault 1973) , these two visions o f the body simply reflected and reproduced two incommensurable worlds. To cast the first vision as mistaken is therefore to create the illusion that the body o f modern medicine has always existed as the only body there ever was, and o f death and disease as always having inhabited this same anatomical space.
In the history of medicine, this ... illusion functions as a retrospective justification: if the old beliefs had for so long such prohibitive power, it was because doctors had to feel, in the depths of their scientific appetite, the repressed need to open up corpses. There lies the point of error, and the silent reason why it was so constandy made: the day it was admitted that lesions explained symptoms, and that the clinic was founded on pathological anatomy, it became necessary to invoke a transfigured history, in which the opening up of corpses, at least in the name of scientific requirements, preceded a finally positive observation of patients; the need to know the dead must have already existed when the concern to understand the living appeared. So a dismal conjuration of dissection, an anatomical church milit ant and suffering, whose hidden spirit made the clinic possible before itself surfacing into the regular, authorized, diurnal practice of autopsy, was imagined out of nothing. (Foucault 1976: 125-6) To identify this history as one that had been imaginatively conjured out o f nothing through its fiction o f the body as an unvarying entity independent o f anatomical practice, required that Foucault demonstrate the alternative, that in fact it was only in the actual practice o f the doctor to the patient that the anatomized body o f the individual could have emerged at all.
Spatialization
The exact superposition of the "body' of the disease and the body of the sick man is no more than a historical, temporary datum. Their encounter is self-evident only for us, or, rather, we are only just beginning to detach ourselves from it. The space of configuration of the disease and the space of localization of the illness in the body have been superimposed, in medical experience, for only a short period of time -the period that coincides with n in e te e n th -c e n tu ry m e d ic in e an d the p riv ile g e s a cco rd e d to p a th o lo g ic a l an ato m y. (F o u cau lt 1976: 3-4 ) Following Armstrong (1995), the concept o f spatialization is a device for analysing the play o f the gaze at any given point in the history o f the present, and refers to the triumvirate o f cognition, perception and practice that configure disease and determine the space and location of illness. The cognitive component refers to what Foucault called 'primary spatialization' , and addresses the conceptual ordering o f the elements o f illness, such as sign, symptom and lesion. The perceptual component corresponds to 'secondary spatialization', and refers to the location of illness in relation to the body o f the patient. The practical component was called by Foucault 'tertiary spatialization' and consists in the con crete practices, techniques and institutional arrangements that constitute health-care activity.
To For bedside medicine, primary spatialization made illness cotermin ous with the symptoms reported by the patient, so a headache or abdominal pain was the illness. This was therefore a medicine for which there was no lesion, and secondary spatialization thus located illness to a point beyond the body where it hovered until coinciding with the body to induce the symptoms experienced by the patient. Because all diseases would in the course o f their autonomous progression move through and out o f the body, the physician's diagnostic task involved capturing this mobility by closely monitoring the sequence of symptoms. 'Presence in an organ is never absolutely necessary to define a disease: thus disease may travel from one point o f localization to another ... while remaining identical in nature' (Foucault 1976: 10) . In this way diseases could be classified after a 'botanical model' into the families, genera and species that composed God's garden o f pathology'. Within this garden illnesses sharing similar symptoms were evidence that they shared a common root. For instance, because paralysis, apoplexy (stroke) and syncope (fainting) all result in the abolition o f voluntary movement, they were manifestations o f the same disease: 'when they become dense enough, these similarities cross the threshold o f mere kinship and accede to the unity o f essence' (Foucault 1976: 7) . Since diseases themselves deter mined when and where they would appear and disappear, tertiary spatialization demanded that doctors avoid extracting patients from the natural locus o f the disease, and treatment was ideally accomplished at the bedside o f the patient by the physician whose task was to wait and watch as the disease ran its autonomous course through time and the body. 'The natural locus o f disease is the natural locus o f life -the family: gentle, spontaneous care, expressive o f love and a common desire for cure, assists in its struggle against the illness, and allows the illness itself to attain its own truth' (p. 17). Primary, secondary and tertiary spatialization thus maintained a medical space in which the body o f the patient was a subsidiary problem, and even a barrier to proper diagnosis. Where bedside medicine had subtracted the patient and the interior o f the body, the tertiary respatialization o f illness marking the lateeighteenth-century rise o f hospital medicine crystallized a gaze for which the individual body o f the patient and its interior were cardinal. Emphasizing the significance to this shift o f tertiary spatialization and underlining the primacy o f hospital practice to the invention o f the body, Foucault argued that the hospital 'is the point of origin o f the most radical questionings. It ... was on the basis of this tertiary spatial ization that the whole o f medical experience was overturned and de fined for its most concrete perceptions, new dimensions, and a new foundation' . (Foucault 1976: 16) The great desecration o f hospital medicine was to move the body of the sick man from the home as the temple o f life and shrine o f disease, to the neutral domain of the hospital (initially regarded as a 'temple of death'), and there to subject it to the practice o f physical examination. These practices denied the truth o f a medicine directed to essential diseases located beyond the body by crowding them together in a space where their purity was corrupted through 'cross-breeding'. Hence they provoked in their beginnings a marked resistance, as instanced by one physician who noted that it would require a very skilful doctor: " 'to avoid the danger o f the false experience that seems to result from the artificial diseases to which he devotes himself in the hospitals. In fact, no hospital disease is a pure disease'" (cited in Foucault 1976: 17).
Highlighting the power o f practice to overturn the truth o f one age and replace it with the next, the sheer repetition o f hospital medicine had by the early 1800s imprinted the reality o f a new anatomy on the social conscience, and by 1858 it was possible to publish the first edition o f Gray's Anatomy. The origins o f this new anatomy lay at a point following the French Revolution when Parisian hospitals underwent an institutional transformation whereby medical research and teaching began to be conducted in 'teaching hospitals'. This shift in tertiary spatialization inserted the bodies o f the sick into a space o f systematic observation where patient could be compared with patient and disease with disease. This relocated the locus o f medical education from authoritative texts to the new classroom o f the ward round, in which doctors took instruction from the very bodies o f the patients they surveyed.
Here one would learn not what the old masters thought they knew, 'but that form o f truth open to all that is manifested in everyday practice: ''Practice will be linked to theoretical precepts. Pupils will be practised in chemical experiments, anatomical dissections, surgical operations, and in the use o f machinery. Read little, see much and do much'" (Foucault 1976: 70) .
The body now isolated to close inspection by sight, touch and smell, the cognitive order o f illness could be reconfigured into a three-dimen sional framework involving symptom, sign and pathology. As under bedside medicine, the symptom remained an index o f how patients experienced illness. But added to this was now the sign. The sign being an intimation o f disease elicited by the attentive physician' (Armstrong 1995: 3) -such as the pulse that betrays the invisible strength and rhythm o f the circulation -neither it nor the symptom was the illness. Together, though, they triangulated the position and nature o f the underlying lesion within the body that was the disease. A new relationship between surface and depth was therefore established by this clinico-pathological correlation, to dispel the earlier notion o f disease as an autonomous and mobile entity. Disease was instead located to a fixed point within the body, demanding innovative perceptual techniques that would allow doctors to see into its three-dimensional interior. The installation o f hospital medicine thus necessitated invention o f the classical techniques o f clinical examination (percussion, palpation, auscultation and inspec tion), each a means o f extending the doctor's sensory apparatus and making transparent the opaque depths o f the body to see the lesion within.
The secondary spatialization o f illness to the interior o f the body turned death into a tactic o f seeing life. For bedside medicine, disease had departed the body with the patient's demise, and so it was futile to search the corpse for traces o f its nature. Accordingly, while dissection did occur, its aim was not to observe the body's interior but rather illustrate the schemata set out in authoritative texts about its 'humoural' systems, 'members' and 'virtues' (see Chapter 3). In contrast, the post mortem was an essential component o f hospital medicine, for it enabled the exact nature o f the hidden lesion to be incontrovertibly identified.
Life, disease, and death now form a technical and conceptual trinity. The continuity of the age-old beliefs that placed the threat of disease in life and of the approaching presence of death in disease is broken; in its place is articulated a triangular figure the summit of which is defined by death. It is from the height of death that one can see and analyse organic dependences and pathological sequences. Instead of being ... the night in which life disappeared, in which even the disease becomes blurred, it is now endowed with that great power of elucidation that dominates and reveals both the space of the organism and the time of the disease ... It is no longer that of a living eye, but the gaze of an eye that has seen death -a great white eye that unties the knot of life. (Foucault 1976: 144) Either side o f this shift from bedside to hospital medicine are the very different objects and effects o f very different spatializations. As demonstrated in the following chapters, there is good reason to conclude that it is never in what is seen or who does the seeing that the forces governing these shifts reside, but rather in the principle o f spatialization and the gaze itself. 'The order o f the solid, visible body is only one way -in all likelihood neither the first, nor the most fundamental -in which one spatializes disease. There have been, and will be, other distributions o f illness' (Foucault 1976: 3) . But without any historically unchanging human anatomy and subject to know and be known, how can there be any knowledge o f the body and the person at all? Foucault's answer to this problem was Discipline and Punish (1977) , which placed knowledge in a productive relationship to power by demonstrating that 'It is not the activity o f the subject o f knowledge that produces a corpus of knowledge, useful or resistant to power, but power-knowledge, the processes and struggles that traverse it and o f which it is made up, that determines the forms and possible domains o f knowledge ' (Foucault 1977: 28) .
P o w e r a n d t h e b o d y

When writing The Birth of the Clinic and The Order o f Things
Foucault had yet to conceptualize a link between power and the great dis junctions in knowing that these analyses had revealed. With Discipline and Punish this missing piece o f the puzzle was found and inserted to complete the diagram o f power and knowledge with which the adjective Foucauldean has become synonymous.
'When I think back now, I ask myself what else it was that I was talking about, in Madness and Civilization or The Birth of the Clinic, if not power? Yet I'm perfectly aware that I scarcely ever used the word and never had such a field o f analyses at my disposal then ' (Foucault, in C. Gordon 1980: 229) . By analysing transformations from the middle ages to the early twentieth century in the control exercised over people, Discipline and Punish (1977) identified a framework in which the emerg ence o f particular ways o f knowing the body could be correlated with changes in how these control strategies operated. The late-eighteenthcentury discovery o f pathological anatomy by which diseases were localized to the body's interior as it lay in the strictly ordered space o f the hospital could now be seen as contemporaneous with analogous changes in the regime o f criminal punishment. From being subjected to torture, pillorying and public display, the criminal started to be incarcerated and subject to continuous surveillance in the closed and cellular space o f the prison. Changes in two disparate and opposing domains o f practice thus converged around the common pole of isolating the body as the object and effect o f an increasingly sustained, intimate and penetrating surveillance.
Foucault defined this moment not as one o f humanist enlightenment, but rather as one where power was reconfigured, the point at which what could now be known as sovereign power gave way to what from here on would be seen as the practice o f disciplinary power.
Sovereignty and the spectacle o f power Symbolized by the majestic visibility o f the king, it is easy to appreciate the mechanics o f sovereign power, since in addition to its dramatic prominence it is to sovereign power that conventional analyses o f control continue to speak when they refer to power as if it were something that is 'acquired, seized or shared, something that one holds on to or allows to slip away' (Foucault 1979: 94)-Functioning through being visible to those on whom it had its effects, the force of sovereign power was epitomized in Foucault's famous description o f the public torture and execution of Damiens the regicide. Analogous with the less bloody but equally ostentatious displays o f monarchial might enacted in rituals, palaces, processions and public displays signifying the royal presence, such ceremonies o f torture realized a power that constituted the public as an extension o f the monarchial body with the king as its head. 'In a society like that o f the seventeenth century, the King's body wasn't a metaphor, but a political reality. Its physical presence was necessary for the functioning o f the monarchy' (Foucault, in C. Gordon 1980: 55) . Abstracted as a relationship of visibility, sovereign power was a massive and capricious force depend ent for its functioning upon the visibility o f itself. It was, accordingly, a regime where the only 'individuals' it produced were those (famous and infamous) inscribed on the conscience o f the public through privilege, ritual, heroics and ceremony. Because sovereignty depended on its being seen by the unseen eyes o f the crowd it moreover demanded that this presence be constantly renewed. T h e public execution, however hasty and everyday, belongs to a whole series of great rituals in which power is eclipsed and restored (coronations, entry o f the king into a conquered city, the submission o f rebellious subjects) ' (Foucault 1977: 48) . As shown in Chapter 3 where the knowledge implications o f this sovereign power are explored, its principle o f exertion over bodies to bend them into an homogenous mass was mirrored in its constitution o f living things as formed from the outside by the equally capricious forces o f God, the planets and the climate.
Against sovereign power (but never instead o f it, since the two powers continue to coexist), there occurred towards the end of the 1700s a displacement in power's point o f application. For it was then that the visibility o f sovereign power in the dramatic theatres o f punish ment started to have effects opposite to its intended consequences. Instead o f uniting the masses in sympathy with the king against offenders, the scaffold spectacle began to create a solidarity between the condemned and the watching crowd against the king (Foucault 1977-63) . The moment the effectiveness o f these techniques started to fade was when the scenic model o f sovereignty became displaced by the secretive device o f the prison, and marked not the rise o f a new humanism in justice, but rather the switch to a more efficient practice o f social control, 'a tendency toward a more finely tuned justice ... a closer penal mapping o f the body ' (Foucault 1977: 78) . Appearing as a complex tissue o f events, 'often minor processes, o f different origin and scattered location, which overlap, repeat or imitate one another' (P-139), this moment was the shift to disciplinary power that was shared by the new gaze o f pathological anatomy as it magnified the once irrelevant interior o f the body. For, just as the medical gaze made individual anatomy into its new point o f application, so the regime o f criminal punishment began to install the novel practice o f the peni tentiary and its solitary inmates.
Through its physical assault upon the body, sovereign power had made the body into a screen for broadcasting monarchial might by the inscription o f pain. For the penitentiary, it was not the body's surface that mattered, but rather its interior, its rhythms o f sleep and waking, eating and hunger, social intercourse, and tolerance for solitude. The great theatres o f pain were gone, and in their place a new 'economy' of the power to punish, to assure its better distribution, so that it should be neither too concentrated at certain privileged points, nor too divided between opposing authorities, so that it should be dis tributed in homogenous circuits capable of operating everywhere, in a continuous way, down to the finest grain of the social body. (Foucault 1977: 80) By the late eighteenth century the body o f the ordinary person had thus replaced the body o f the king as the effect o f power, as rituals for restoring monarchial integrity were displaced by remedies and thera peutic devices deployed towards the bodies o f everyone.
Panopticism and disciplinary power Collectively known as disciplinary power, devices directed to ordering and analysing the bodies o f everyone found condensed expression in Bentham's 1843 design for an ideal prison, the Panopticon. Disciplinary power inverted the scenic principle of sovereignty, for its functioning demanded not the visibility o f itself but of its target, 'and that target was the individual body which became at the same time both object and effect o f the disciplinary gaze ' (Armstrong 1983: 4) . Hence the mid-nineteenth-century possibility for Bentham to conceive o f the Panopticon and Panopticism as 'a way o f obtaining from power "in hitherto unexampled quantity ... a great and new form o f government" ' (Foucault 1977: 206) .
The Panopticon was a circular building divided into cells and built as a ring around an observational tower at its centre. Each cell had two windows: an outer one illuminating the inmate, and a shuttered inner one allowing a guard in the central tower to observe the inmates, but not the inmates to observe the guard. Side walls to each cell prevented the inmate from communication with other inmates, and so each inmate was 'seen but does not see; he is the object o f information, never a subject o f communication ' (Foucault 1977: 200) . Each cell was thus like a small theatre in which the solitary actor was perfectly individualized and constantly visible, yet never certain of actually being watched and so perpetually subject to the gaze o f the guard. 'In short, the principle o f the dungeon is reversed; daylight and the overseer's gaze capture the inmate more effectively than darkness, which afforded after all a sort o f protection' (Foucault, in C. Gordon 1980: 147) . The Panopticon therefore made the operation o f power continuous by inducing in the inmate a state o f conscious and permanent visibility that assured the automatic functioning o f power (Foucault 1977: 201) . Initially conceived o f as a prison, the Panopticon was also a principle of power through surveillance, and so could extend beyond convicts to the lunatic, the schoolchild, the patient, the worker and the entire population.
With the swarming o f such techniques for monitoring and mani pulating the gestures, capabilities, behaviours, illnesses and ideas of everyone, the political axis o f individualization underlying sovereignty found its final reversal, to allow the spread of discipline. Individual ization under sovereign power had been 'ascending', such that the closer bodies were to the king the more they were marked off by ceremony. In the disciplinary regime individualization is 'descending' , for as power increases its anonymity and functionality, so those on whom it is exercised are more strongly individualized. Not by ceremony, but by surveillance, and not by commemorative accounts with ancestry as their referents, but by comparative measures against a 'norm ' .
T h e m o m e n t th at sa w th e tra n sitio n fr o m h isto rico -ritu al m e c h a n ism s fo r the fo rm a tio n o f in d iv id u a lity to th e scien tifico -d isc ip lin ary m ech an ism s, w h e n the n o r m a l to o k o v e r fr o m the an c estral, an d m e a su re m e n t fro m statu s, th u s s u b stitu tin g fo r the in d iv id u ality o f the m e m o ra b le m a n th at o f th e calcu lab le m an , th at m o m e n t w h e n the scien ces o f m an b ec a m e possible is th e m o m e n t w h e n a n e w te c h n o lo g y o f p o w e r an d a n e w p o litica l a n a to m y o f th e b o d y w e re im p le m e n te d . (F o u cau lt 1977: 193) While maximized where new innovations in architecture laid down particular places for particular individuals, the exercise o f discipline was not restricted to concrete domains, and its manifestations appeared wherever the techniques o f bodily surveillance emerged to prominence in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In schools, pupils began to be tested to ascertain their scholastic proficiency; in the army, the new routine o f drill and parade-ground inspections operated to create a disciplined soldier, and in workshops, schools and hospitals the timetable -long used in monastic communities to prevent idleness -was widely introduced to subject bodies to temporal ordering through the establish ment o f rhythms and regulated cycles o f repetition. These were just some o f the 'means o f correct training' necessary to a power that replaced the homogenizing effect o f the crowd under the regime o f sovereignty with a collection o f separate individualities.
The means o f correct training Inherent in the Panopticon's arrangement o f fights, fines o f sight and barriers, were the three instruments by which discipline jumped the walls o f the prison to infiltrate the most intimate elements o f the social and the individual.
The first o f these instruments was hierarchical observation. This refers to the principle o f concretizing inconspicuous surveillance in the way that built space is configured around the problem o f who can see and who can be seen. For instance, how should the tents o f a military camp or dwellings in a housing estate be arranged so that each occupant comes to be part o f a network o f gazes that supervise one another? Or, what is the optimal layout in the classroom that will ensure scholars know they are being seen while allowing the watching teacher to remain the discrete observer? Or, when the number o f bodies to be supervised becomes too great to be seen by a single eye, how to install further observational relays? Each time such questions are asked it is to the instrument o f hierarchical observation that they speak.
The second instrument o f disciplinary surveillance is normalizing judgement, by which individuals can be assessed and measured through their comparison with others. As the term implies, normalizing judge ment refers to all those procedures (even that as simple as having people stand in fine according to their height), which in creating a field of comparison between different individuals allows the generation o f a norm with which to grade the capacity, attributes or performance of The workshop, the school, the army were subject to a whole micro-penalty of time (latenesses, absences, interruptions of tasks), of activity (inattention, negligence, lack of zeal), of behaviour (impoliteness, disobedience), of speech (idle chatter, insolence), of the body ('incorrect' attitudes, irregular gestures, lack of cleanliness), of sexuality (impurity, indecency). (Foucault 1977: 178) T h e e x a m in a tio n is a n a lo g o u s to a cell o f th e P a n o p tic o n , an d is th e refo re a fu n c tio n a l site th at tr a n sfo r th at c a p tu re s a n d fixes th e m in a p e r m a n e n t a n a ly tic sp a ce . filing, the examination 'makes each individual a case ... a case which at one and the same time constitutes an object o f knowledge and hold for a branch o f power ' (p. 191) . Limited only by these parameters, the flexibility o f the examination makes it the quintessential disciplinary device, a compact and portable Panopticon that requires no walls, towers or guards for its successful operation, and which through its properties o f recording can interlink every point in the disciplinary regime to every other, so making the distribution o f power continuous and autonomous o f any 'control centre'.
To summarize this analysis o f power, the spectacle o f punishment and the ritual o f the examination invoke the principles o f two very different diagrams o f power, and with them two equally distinct domains o f possible objects and effects.
1. Where sovereignty exerts control through violence and restraint, discipline does so through surveillance alone. 2. Where sovereign power requires the visibility o f itself, the unseen force o f discipline makes visible the individual as object, effect and target o f power. 3. Where sovereign power emanates from a central point, disciplinary power is relational and distributed into each body and every gap between bodies. 4. Where sovereign power is sporadically eclipsed and restored, dis cipline functions constantly and automatically through recruitment o f the individual and the social as its relays. 5. Where sovereign power destroys and conceals beneath its weight, disciplinary power creates and illuminates its points o f articulation in the objects, effects and knowledges it sustains.
Despite these clear distinctions between sovereignty and discipline, their operation is never mutually exclusive. As demonstrated in the substantive chapters o f this study, the shift from sovereignty to discipline has been one o f emphasis. For while the late-nineteenth-century demise o f the public execution as a legal means o f justice in many parts o f Africa marked the point where sovereignty formally bowed to discipline, this inversion in the relationship o f visibility between colonial power and the African body enabled a new complex o f calculable sovereignty to emerge. In this, the analytic gaze o f discipline produced as visible objects those individuals and groups on whom the dramatic spectacles o f sovereignty could then be selectively visited: in the shape o f the missionary doctor's theatres o f healing aimed at demonstrating the power o f 'God's medicine' to the watching witch doctors; in the form o f the heat chamber as a spectacle o f the mining industry's might over the body o f the African; and in the technique o f the psychological test and its isolation o f the African as a 'dangerous individual' to be targeted by the tactics o f violent repression.
Discipline as power and the disciplined society How should this theory o f power be read, especially in Africa, where every day sees the mob against the spectacular might of the army or police, where conventional history over even the last decade is punctuated by burning barricades, brutal acts o f state violence and waves o f 'ethnic cleansing'? Certainly, this speaks to societies that are not 'disciplined' in the sense o f con sisting in people who mechanically obey the dictates o f the state and meekly conform to their politically and economically allocated place in the social order. But, and precisely because this notion o f a 'disciplined' society reflects the idea that certain groups could hold power and exert it over others, this has no bearing upon whether African societies are or are not disciplinary societies. As is made abundantly clear in the follow ing chapters, most African societies have since at least the turn o f the twentieth century been constructed and organized in ways that starkly reflect the programmatic structure of the Panopticon, confirming that while not 'disciplined' they most definitely are disciplinary societies.
What then is to be made o f the resistance to colonialism that con stituted so great a part o f the African past? Surely, in refuting the tactics o f repression and subjectification aimed at inducing acceptance o f their place as the 'dominated', black Africans have given the lie to discipline? Such critique assumes that resistance is contrary to disciplinary power, that where there is resistance there is no power, or at least a sufficient weakening to let the 'authentic' person emerge from beneath its crush ing weight. But this too is mistaken, for not only do such arguments speak to sovereign power alone -which can and must be resisted -but also to the idea o f 'freedom', which in its modern guise is itself a product o f disciplinary power. For freedom today means the freedom o f the individual, but since it is the individual who is a product of disciplinary power, the struggle to defend the 'rights of man' is itself as no more than another facet of discipline. Far from being a threat to the disciplinary regime, resistance is precisely that through which it cease lessly expands and reproduces itself: 'Disciplinary power ... provokes and works through resistance: an up-raised hand to avert the gaze o f surveillance marks the beginning o f a self-existence for the nascent individual' (Armstrong 1987: 69).
Analysing power: methodological requirements
Flowing from the Foucauldean analysis o f power into its sovereign and disciplinary manifestations are a number o f methodological require ments.
The first requirement is that analyses avoid thinking o f power as having a fixed form, for it is only through variations o f the practices outlined above that it condenses into the political diagrams o f sovereignty and discipline. Hence 'it is necessary to be a nominalist: power is not a stricture, or a certain force with which people are endowed; it is a name given to a complex strategic relation in a given society' (Foucault, in C. Gordon 1980: 27) .
Second, because power creates itself in concrete practices, analyses should address power not at its formal centres in society (which are simply points o f concentration within a generalized force field) but 'at its extremities ... those points where it becomes capillary' (Foucault, in C. Gordon 1980: 96) , such as where the pincers are applied to tear the flesh, or, in a disciplinary regime, the gaze o f the psychiatrist to the electroencephalogram o f the patient. The Foucauldean analysis is always ascending, moving from these capillary points o f application to the more general mechanisms (like the monarchy, the economy, the state or the liberation struggle) that require the human objects and subjects that power invents.
The third requirement holds that since power is not the product but the producer o f human interests, desires and motives, analyses must not concern themselves with power at the level o f conscious decision or intention: 'It should refrain from posing the labyrinthine and un answerable question: "W ho then has power and what has he in mind?" ... Instead, it is a case o f studying power at the point where its intention, if it has one, is completely invested in its real and effective practices' (p. 97). The emphasis upon 'real and effective practices' is important also to underline the point that the Foucauldean analysis o f power avoids linguistic reductionism. When it does use the term 'discourse' (as in parts o f this study) what is referred to is not the meaning o f the body created through language and dialogue alone, but also the concrete practices o f the socio-medical sciences (such as the way the doctor's hands palpate the body, or how built space conditions hygienic habits).
The final methodological observation addresses the question o f ideo logy which, because it forms so central a theme in the conventional discourse around colonialism and the socio-medical sciences in Africa, is more fully addressed in the Postscript (Chapter 10). Suffice here to note that in the Foucault schema power is never to be thought o f as ideo logical.
■ The anatomy o f power
It is b o th m u c h m o re an d m u c h less th an id e o lo g y ... It is th e p ro d u c tio n o f e ffectiv e in stru m e n ts fo r th e fo rm a tio n an d a c c u m u la tio n o f k n o w le d g e -m e th o d s o f o b se rv a tio n , te c h n iq u e s o f re g istra tio n , a p p a ra tu se s o f c o n tro l. A ll this m e a n s th at p o w e r ... can n o t b u t e v o lv e , o rg a n ise an d p u t in to c ircu latio n a k n o w le d g e , o r ra th e r a p p a ra tu se s o f k n o w le d g e , w h ic h are n o t id e o lo g ic a l co n stru cts. (F o u (1977) . The result is a theoretical and methodological apparatus able to problematize the existence and trans formations o f the human body as an object and effect o f socio-medical power by disrupting all humanist assumptions concerning the idea o f it as a transcendental, unchanging entity, and, reciprocally, o f knowledge as something that progressively accrues to enhance steadily the truth o f what we know.
Instead, a continuous present is set in place in which the body is always contingent upon the force relations that concretize themselves in the procedures deployed to know it and the bodies o f socio-medical knowledge that result. Substitute for the Panopticon as prison the hospital or clinic; replace the unseen but all-seeing guard with the doctor or nurse; see the silent, mystifying experience o f the medical examina tion as the side walls prohibiting communication among the inmates, and construe the ever-expanding archives o f disease statistics and patient files as the raw material from which the ambient infra-penalties o f normalizing judgement silently form themselves. The seemingly un ambiguous object language o f textbook medicine metamorphoses, as do the actions o f the researcher, clinician and health administrator, into the components o f a finely wrought disciplinary regime, geared to the surveillance and subde modulation o f the interior and the exterior o f the body, o f the relations between different bodies, and o f the social itself.
Turning now from this abstract and general anatomy o f power, Chapter 3 commences its application to the production o f a specifically African anatomy o f power, by entering a present where how the body was understood and became an effect o f power confirmed the existence o f bodies in Africa which in their shape and form are today un imaginable to conventional historians, except as bizarre and grotesquely prejudiced distortions o f the 'truth' as it appears in Gray's Anatomy.
